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Telecommunications liberalisation has changed the rules of the game within the industry. One of 
the economic goals of liberalisation policy is to promote competition so that consumers enjoy 
better prices, quality and choice. Therefore, incumbent operators are no longer protected by 
exclusive and special rights. Abolishing exclusivities promotes market entry and competition, 
while enforcing asymmetric regulations to reach a level-playing field helps new entrants to 
compete with incumbent operators.  
 
Liberalisation policies changed the rules of the game at the institutional level as well. The old 
model consisted of state monopoly supplying and regulating telecommunications. For 
liberalisation and competition to effectively work this model had to be modified and the state had 
to relinquish any vested interests in the market.  
 
Another institutional change was the introduction of independent regulatory authorities. 
Although governments retained their right to set the sector’s policy, the day-to-day management 
of the market became the responsibility of national regulatory authority. In some countries, such 
as Japan, South Korea, and Israel, regulation of the market remained the responsibility of the 
government.  
 
This paper presents the case of the Palestinian Authority with regard to regulation of 
telecommunications and investigates its institutional foundation in order to decide on a 
compatible regulatory system. The paper follows a qualitative research approach in two parts. 
The first part examines the institutional endowment framework described by Levy and Spiller 
(Levy and Spiller, 1994; Levy and Spiller, 1996). It also presents comments and criticism of the 
framework and incorporates new developments on institutional capacity related to unstable 
states.  
 
The second part presents the current institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority and 
problems towards adopting regulatory reform and installing a better regulatory system that 
responds to the complex regulatory issues of today’s telecommunications. Data was collected 
from governmental and international reports that track institutional developments in the 





The remainder of this paper consists of the following: Section 2 provides a theoretical framework 
and examines Levy and Spiller’s institutional endowment framework, section 3 presents a brief 
summary of the status of telecommunications in the Palestinian territories, section 4 presents 
Palestine’s institutional endowment, section 5 discusses Palestinian Authority’s fragility and its 
impact on regulatory reforms, while section 6 provides a brief conclusion. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1  The regulatory state 
The debate on the need for regulation is deeply rooted in economics, political science and other 
fields. The free market school of thought, inspired by Adam Smith’s invisible hand, argue that 
market forces can handle market inefficiencies without the need of the state’s intervention 
through regulation. At the other extreme, the government intervention school of thought (public 
interest theory, capture theory, or economic theory of regulation) argues that market externalities 
justifies government intervention through regulation.  
 
Hence, two competing approaches to regulation emerged (Lodge, 1999), the “Regulation as an 
act of benevolence” approach, which considers regulation as a necessity and the “Regulation as a 
conspiracy” approach, which considers regulation as a pure waste of resources. A third approach 
treats regulation as neither bad nor good but looks at regulation as a “question of design”. This 
approach depends on agent-principal literature as it argues that best possible policy outcomes are 
produced if regulation is institutionalised and designed with a set of control mechanisms and 
defined processes for efficient, fair, accountable and transparent regulation. 
 
Regulation by design was an essential component of telecommunications market liberalisation. 
Lodge (1999) argues that while the experience of European states differ, all states departed from 
the “welfare state” to the “regulatory state” as there was a shift from public ownership and 
economic stabilisation and redistribution policies towards procedural and performance-oriented 
regulation. Eyre and Sitter (1999) point out that regulatory reform has changed the institutional 
design and created independent agencies that embrace the principle of separation between 
operation and regulation. There were no more post, telegraph and telephone service agencies 
(PTTs) but independent national regulatory authorities (NRAs). 
 
2.2  State’s institutional foundations 
There is a vast literature on the institutional design of the regulatory process that covers issues 
related to a regulatory authority’s structure, functions, procedures, and values
[2]
. There is also 
literature (eg Levy and Spiller, 1994; Levy and Spiller, 1996; Saleh, 2010; Stirton and Lodge, 
2002; and Thatcher, 1999) that looks at regulatory reform and its relationship with the state’s 
institutions. Since the objective of this paper is to identify the most compliant 
telecommunications regulatory system to be installed in the Palestinian Authority, it will discuss 
the later set of literature. 
 
Levy and Spiller (1994, 1996) argue that the design of an effective regulatory system that 
ensures regulatory certainty and commitment depends on the country’s institutional endowments. 
They look at regulation as a contract between a government and an operator and argue that 
because of the intrinsic characteristics of telecommunications (economies of scale, sunk costs, 
etc), governments have an incentive to attempt administrative exploitations in order to achieve 
short-term gains such as lowering local calls tariffs or setting better labour contracts. Their main 
focus was to study the formal and informal mechanisms that are embedded in the country’s main 
institutions (judiciary, legislative and executive), which place formal and informal restraints on 
the government exploitation attempts, restraints on regulatory discretion, and constraints on 
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changing the regulatory system.  
 
Development and enforcement of such restraining mechanisms depend on what they define as 
the country’s institutional endowment (Levy and Spiller, 1994), which explains how laws and 
regulations are adopted and enforced (legislative and executive structure), how disputes are 
resolved (judicial system), the degree of influence social customs and norms have on adopting 
restraint mechanisms and the impact of state bureaucrats’ experience on enforcing such 
mechanisms. 
 
Such institutional endowment framework formulates a decision tree that defines the type of 
regulatory design compatible with the state’s institutions. Figure 1 presents Levy and Spiller’s 
decision tree.  
 
 
Figure 1. Levy and Spiller’s regulatory design decision tree 
 
Using this decision tree, investors can decide whether to invest in a country that lacks an 
independent judiciary but has been committed to an international agreement, such as the World 
Trade Organisation’s Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA), which would serve as an 
international guarantee that would protect their investment from arbitrary exploitation. On the 
other hand, a country would decide to efficiently use its resources and adopt a simple-rules 
regulatory system if it has a weak bureaucracy. 
 
Therefore, regulatory design (governance and incentives) should be compliant with the country’s 
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own institutional endowment. An unstable country, in that sense, may not be able to effectively 
import the telecommunications regulatory framework of a country like the UK, because it does 
not have the same institutional endowment of the UK in terms of an independent judiciary, a 
proper system of checks and balances, etc.  
 
2.3  Administrative exploitation or regulatory reform? 
According to Stirton and Lodge (2002) however, Levy and Spiller’s model simplifies regulation 
into a one-dimensional contractual problem between the state and the operator(s). At the core of 
this problem is the assumption that governments’ actions are nothing but attempts at 
administrative exploitation. Saleh (2010), Stirton and Lodge (2002), and Thatcher (1999) provide 
a different view.  
 
Thatcher (1999, p. 8) explains that awareness of the possibility of competition has increased, 
especially after the deregulation movement in the USA and the UK during the 1980s. However, 
this political will of deregulation or liberalisation of the sector, led by the EU and national 
governments, was met with fierce opposition from the incumbent operators and labour trade 
unions. 
 
Saleh (2010) explains in detail how globalisation has escalated the fight between new forces 
(global financial conglomerates, large manufacturers, retail chains
[3]
) pushing for the “flexible 
accumulation” model, which required opening up of the telecommunications sector to 
competition, and incumbent operators and trade unions fighting back to keep the Fordism model, 
which kept telecommunications under monopoly structure. 
 
Stirton and Lodge (2002) argue that reducing regulation to a contractual problem
[4]
 contributes to 
the premise that governments’ behaviour is perceived as administrative exploitation rather than a 
genuine attempt to respond to economic developments (technological progress and its impact on 
the cost of supplying telecommunications services) and to ensure that regulations evolve to meet 
economic and social goals. In addition, the framework overlooks research in regulation regarding 
the capture theory, where network industries have been dominated by monopolies that have a 
high degree of influence on telecommunications-related policies. 
 
Furthermore, Stirton and Lodge (2002) have examined the validity of Levy and Spiller’s 
endowment framework on Jamaica by investigating empirical data on its regulatory system. They 
argue that the Jamaican experience on liberalisation provides a different explanation than the 
framework’s initial hypothesis proposes. In particular, the fight between the Jamaican 
government and the private monopoly Cable & Wireless (C&W) on market restructuring does 
not present the hypothesis of a government trying to exploit private investment; instead, such a 
fight was essential for liberalisation of the sector, given that the government still honoured 
C&W’s exclusivity agreement. 
 
This explanation is interesting in two ways. First, it strengthens the validity of Levy and Spiller’s 
framework as it proposes that Jamaica has been improving alongside the decision tree. Second, it 
calls to carefully read events of sectorial reforms in countries to determine whether such events 
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should be accounted as administrative exploitation or simply a part of normal conflict between 
political and economic agents until a new equilibrium is reached. Once a new equilibrium is 
reached and a new market structure is in place, the framework should be used to ensure that there 
is a match between a state’s institutional foundations and its regulatory system. 
 
Stirton and Lodge’s (2002) validation of the framework and Favaro and Winter’s (2004) account 
of institutional changes within Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean states contributes to the 
conclusion that Jamaica’s institutional endowment has changed and that by strengthening its 
capacity and achieving greater autonomy of its administration (both in telecommunications and 
in general) Jamaica’s has climbed the ladder of Levy and Spiller’s decision tree. 
 
Other research contributes to the validity of the framework. For example, Bolhoff (2001, p. 16) 
studied institutional reform within the telecommunications industry in Germany and the UK. He 
found that the UK’s initial regulatory design consisted of a regulatory agency (OFTEL) that had 
close links to the Office of Fair Trade (OFT) with regards to its design. OFTEL has a Director 
General with a degree of discretion as regulatory functions were assigned to the director general 
and not the regulatory agency, which is compliant with the British administrative tradition.  
 
In Germany, Bolhoff (2001, p. 19) argues that although on a macro-organisational level, 
Germany was influenced by European law and the British model of a sector-specific regulatory 
agency
[5]
, traditional German administrative solutions influenced the organisation at the  micro-
level. 
 
2.4  Within the context of unstable states 
Smith (1997) explains that regulatory reforms are implemented in a smoother fashion within 
countries that have institutional experience in comparison to countries that do not. The issue of 
introducing effective regulatory systems in developing countries has been discussed within the 
context of developing countries’ ability to institutionalise regulations despite corruption, 
inexperienced bureaucracy and unstable political systems. 
 
Unstable states represent a subset of the developing states, where economic, social, and political 
problems are substantially more significant to their development. The term “Unstable State” 
includes a wide set of countries and is usually associated with the terms “Ineffective State“, 
“Fragile State” and “Failing State” (Dhaher, 2011, p. 16). According to the OECD (2008), states 
are fragile “when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions 
needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of 
their populations”. 
 
Within the context of telecommunications fragility varies. Some fragile countries engaged in 
armed conflict experience insufficient and outdated infrastructures or a systematic destruction of 
infrastructure projects (Type A), while fragile countries that lack legitimacy or effectiveness 
experience weak and ineffective regulatory bodies (Type B). Other fragile countries would not 
have full control over the sector so that even if they have an efficient regulator, regulations are 
often not enforced (Type C). Dhaher (2011, p. 17) provides some examples of issues emerging 
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from fragile states, as shown below: 
 




 Arab countries (Type B): Absence of an adequate appeal process and ownership by ruling 
parties/family of telecommunications companies negatively affects quality of regulation 
(Sutherland, 2010). 
 Kosovo (Type C): No international gateways are assigned to Kosovo. Regulatory 
authorities use Serbian and Slovenian international gateways (Cullen International, 
2010). 
 Palestinian territories (Type B & C): The bulk of core network (switches) are hosted 
outside the territory; spectrum frequency allocation is controlled by Israeli authorities; 
imported equipment takes a long time (years) for security clearance (World Bank, 2008). 
 
Marshall and Cole’s (2010) index of state fragility distinguish between fragility in government 
legitimacy and fragility in government effectiveness. Government legitimacy refers to the 
acceptance of political authority by population or political authority that is acquired or exercised 
according to certain socially accepted normative standards and criteria. Government 
effectiveness refers to the government’s ability to capacity and institutional development. 
 
Alemu and Khan (2011) show that inflow of direct investment funds depends on fragility in 
government effectiveness but not in government legitimacy. Investors seek to ensure that the 
government has put in place proper mechanisms to protect their investments and maintain rule of 
law. This finding explains why investments in telecommunications networks and services have 
been made in fragile states such as Egypt or Tunisia that lack government legitimacy but, 
nonetheless, have put in place some form of an effective institutional set up. It also supports 
Levy and Spiller’s framework as it shows that the problem of regulation is actually a problem of 
commitment and effectiveness of the states’ institutions.  
 
Levy and Spiller (1994) investigated two fragile countries; Argentina and the Philippines. Their 
main findings show a political-investment cycle, where businesses that support one political 
party or social/ethnic group will be rewarded with high rents when the political party or 
social/ethnic group take power, while businesses that support their rivals will be deprived of any 
rewards. Corruption and low respect for the rule of the law were also observed in the two 
countries. 
 
Problems of commitment and effectiveness can be solved when there is political will and 
capacity to install a legitimate and effective regulatory system. (Brown et al 2006, p. 85) The 
problem of low will and capacity can be expected in fragile states as governments resist attempts 
to reduce their control. In order to secure long terms in power, politicians will resort to illegal 
and economically damaging activities such as accepting bribes and other corrupt practices in 
exchange for the distribution of subsidies, licences, loans, jobs or services (Duckett, 2001, p. 23). 
 
Within such an environment, an institutional vacuum can be expected, where impartiality of the 
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judiciary can be questioned, and control of the government over key decisions can be observed. 
The choices of the best regulatory system to choose from Levy and Spiller’s decision tree will be 
confined to either state monopoly or a licence-based regulatory system with international 
guarantee. 
 
3. Institutional foundations of the Palestinian Authority 
3.1  Brief summary of telecommunications in the Palestinian territories  
The economic annex of the declaration of principles agreement (Oslo agreement) in 1993 
permitted the newly established Palestinian Authority to build and maintain public 
telecommunications networks in the Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip). 
International gateways, spectrum frequency and equipment imports all remained under Israeli 
control and management. Disputes are resolved by the Joint Technical Committee, which consist 
of Palestinian and Israeli representatives. 
  
The Ministry of Telecommunications and Post (later renamed as the Ministry of 
Telecommunications and Information Technology, MTIT) took charge of building a public 
telecommunications network in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In April 1996, the 1996 
Telecommunications Law was signed by the PA President
 [7]
, which provided a legal and 
regulatory framework for the telecommunications and post sectors. 
 
The law envisioned a typical model of a state-owned sector, where the ministry acts as both 
operator and regulator allowing, at the same time, private entities to get licences for either 
building public networks or providing value-added services. The goal of such a licensing regime 
is to create competition within the system. Licenses with monopoly clauses/status were 
considered illegal as indicated by article 7 of the law. 
 
However, this vision changed rapidly. In the same year, the Ministry issued a 20-year licence for 
Paltel, a public shareholding company comprised of private Palestinian investors and the 
Palestinian Authority
 [8]
, to build the network. The licence included an exclusivity period of 10 
years for the fixed network and 5 years or 100,000 subscribers (whichever comes first) for the 
mobile network. The Ministry stopped supplying telecommunications services and resigned its 
role as sector regulator. Within two years, Paltel reached the 100,000 mobile subscribers 
threshold and. by the end of its exclusivity in 2006, it increased fixed lines penetration from 4% 
to 9%. 
 
Market liberalisation efforts started in 2003. Three years later, Wataniya was awarded the 2
nd
 
mobile licence, 30% of which is owned by The Palestinian Authority owns through the Palestine 
Investment Fund. At the same time, a new telecommunications law that promotes market 
liberalisation and competition and introduces an independent regulatory authority was signed by 
the President. Nonetheless, the Palestinian Legislative Council rejected the law on two separate 
occasions. Therefore, the sector remained governed by the 1996 Telecommunications Law. Table 
1 presents major events in market developments since establishment of the Palestinian Authority 
in 1994. 
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Year Market developments 
1994 Palestinian Authority is given the right to build public telecommunications network(s) in West 
Bank and Gaza 
1995 Building and developing a national telecommunications network 
1996 Paltel is awarded a 20-year wired and wireless telecommunications license to build, maintain, 
and develop the national telecommunications network. License included a 10-year exclusivity 
period for fixed telecommunication (ends in 2006) and a (5-year or 100,000 subscribers, 
whichever comes first) exclusivity period for mobile telecommunications. 
Ministry of Telecommunications and Post regulated Paltel’s prices and quality. 
2003 Calls for liberalisation of the market initiated by ISOC, Palestine Chapter, and the Palestinian IT 
Association of Companies (PITA) 
Paltel exclusivity on mobile ends (more than 100,000 subscribers) 
2005 Paltel introduces the Subscription Free Internet initiative, using exclusivity clauses in its license. 
ISOC, PITA, and ISPs protest against it, but the Ministry approves it. 
2006 Paltel exclusivity on fixed telecommunications ends. 
Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology issues a tender for a second mobile 
operator 
Wataniya, a Kuwaiti-based mobile operator is awarded a 3G mobile license. Wataniya Palestine 
is incorporated and started building its network. 
The legislative Council rejects the 2006 Telecommunications Law. 
2007 Wataniya is denied spectrum by Israeli authorities. Operations are delayed. 
2008 MTIT in West Bank issues licenses for broadband, VoIP, and Wi-Fi service providers. 
Wataniya awaits for Israeli authority to assign spectrum 
2009 After diplomatic pressure, Israeli authorities agree to assign Wataniya 2G spectrum frequency in 
West Bank. Wataniya starts its commercial operations 
MTIT (West Bank) and Paltel sign an agreement that leads to Paltel’s functional separation. 
Paltel is awarded a 3G mobile license, pending availability of spectrum. 
The 2009 Telecommunications law is signed by the president. The legislation committee of the 
paralyzed Legislative Council declares its intent to reject the law in the Council first meeting. 
2010 MTIT (West Bank) introduces bitstream access as first step of introducing competition in data 
market. Same procedure is applied in Gaza by Hamas government. 
2011 Israeli Authorities give Wataniya clearance to install base stations in Gaza and import and deploy 
needed equipment. A 2G service was scheduled to be launched around mid-2012. 
Table1: Governance and telecommunications development (1994-2011) 
 
3.2  Institutional foundations of the Palestinian Authority 
The Palestinian Constitution
 [9]
 describes the governing system in Palestine as a parliamentary 
democratic system, where people directly elect their President and representatives to the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)
 [10]
. The government is led by a prime minister (usually 
leader of the majority) appointed by the president and confirmed by the Legislative Council. A 
complete separation among executive legislative and the judiciary is maintained, while 
independence of the judiciary is emphasised. The economic system is based on free-market 




The constitution sets up an institutional endowment that consists of an independent judiciary, a 
unified government with a possibility of parties alternating in government. Contractual 
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agreements are legally binding. The structure and organisation of institutions imply that 
constraints on governmental exploitation can be imposed and that regulatory system can be 
comprised of an institution that would be independent of the executive and accountable to either 
the legislative council or judiciary or both.  
 
However, in reality the institutional endowment is contradictory to what has been described 
above. Using Levy and Spiller’s framework, Palestine’s institutional endowment resembles 
Argentina and the Philippines’ institutional endowment, which is comprised of “Presidential 
rent-seeking” with a “political investment cycle.” The following sub-sections provide a brief 









 dispute between Paltel and the government (Ministry of 
Finance
 [14]
). A major reason for that was the monopoly status of Paltel over the sector from 1996 
to 2006 and the close relationship they enjoyed with the government, which reflects Levy and 
Spiller (1994) political-investment hypothesis. 
 
Brown (2010) considers the judiciary system as weak and corrupt, and the World Bank
[15]
 shows 
that control of corruption and respect of the rule of the law, which is one of the Palestinian High 
Judicial Council’ s 
[16]
 main elements of judicial independence, is low (less than 50 percentile). 
Interviewed stakeholders believe that independence of the judiciary is less of an issue compared 
to its capacity to resolve telecommunications and competition related disputes.  
 
Unanimously, stakeholders argue that the qualifications and experience of judges to handle 
telecommunications cases and the speed with which a dispute is resolved carried more weight. 
For example, the Internet Society-Palestine (ISOC.PS) believes that the judiciary’s independence 
is adequate, but its capacity to resolve telecommunications disputes constitutes a significant 
problem. For that reason, service level agreements (SLA) are common practice among 
telecommunications operators and service providers. SLAs act as a framework to resolve any 
future disputes and are considered by competitors as an additional guarantee on top of the 
ministry licences, which includes a list of duties, rights and forbidden (anti-competitive) 
practises. 
 
This voluntary practise by the competitors and the compulsory licensing scheme by the ministry 
is compliant with Levy and Spiller’s decision tree, where local (SLAs) and an international 
(World Bank supervised) licensing system is implemented. 
 
3.2.2 Governing structure 
Except for a short period of time (2006-07), where Hamas emerged as a political rival, Fatah, the 
main political party in the Palestinian Authority, dominated the executive and legislative 
branches. Hence, the relationship between the legislator and the executive was smooth as the 
government had full discretion on social, economic and political issues and the legislative hardly 
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used its powers to enforce any type of restraint on government actions. With regard to 
telecommunications, a pattern of political-investment cycle (Levy and Spiller, 1994) can be 
observed on at least two occasions. 
 
The first political-investment cycle started by the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 
1995 and lasted until 2006. While the 1996 Telecommunications Law envisioned a public 
network managed by the ministry and article 7 of the law prohibited any monopolistic activities, 
the government decided to award Paltel with an exclusive wired and wireless 
telecommunications licence. According to World Bank (2011), PA’s decision to award Paltel with 
a statutory monopoly was sound and rational considering the high risk of operating in a politically 
unstable region. Nonetheless, this move by the government was a clear violation of the 1996 
Telecommunication Law and met with no objections from the legislative council or any other 
institution. 
 
Also, the World Bank (2011, p. 35) cites three violations within the licensing procedure that 
benefited Paltel. First, there was no formal public tendering process for the licence. Second, a 
licence was originally given to another group of investors but was revoked by the PA and given 
to Paltel. Finally, the licence and its annexes were kept confidential until 2008, when the licence, 
but not all annexes, was made public. Until that year, MTIT itself did not have a copy of the 
licence. In a recent interview, the current minister of telecommunications said that the ministry’s 





The way the 1996 telecommunications provisions were ignored and Paltel’s licence was handled 
shows that the government used its discretion to influence telecommunications-related decisions 
that favoured Paltel. Interested parties could not clearly identify and protest against some issues 




The lack of formal attempts by the legislature or judiciary to impose any restraint on the 
government’s decisions and the Palestinian Authority’s shares in Paltel
[19]
 are additional 
indicators of the close relationship between the government and Paltel. 
 
The second investment cycle can be observed when a change in power occurred in 2005. As 
Fatah faced internal conflict, Mahmoud Abbas (a Fatah member) took power after the death of 
his political rival and the first president of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat. 
 
A tender for a second mobile operator was issued and Wataniya, the Kuwaiti-based mobile 
operator, won the auction for a 3G mobile licence. Wataniya-Palestine was established. The 
Palestinian Authority, who sold most of its shares in Paltel, invested in 30% of Wataniya-
Palestine’s shares. Also, after it was awarded the licence, Wataniya-Palestine awarded an 
advertising company that is owned by the son of the Palestinian Authority President a major 




These two incidents accompanied by Paltel’s low investments
 [21]
 and other governments’ 
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attempts to liberalise the market show that the change at the political level has resulted in change 
of the businesses favoured by the government and enforces Levy and Spiller (1994, page 220) 
hypothesis that “business owners not aligned with the elite in power tend to be subject to 
administrative exploitation.”  
 
3.2.3 Administrative capabilities 
Bureaucracy in the PA suffers from several inefficiencies that render its performance weak, such 
as a low level of expertise especially in policymaking and technical issues. Another source is 
corruption and weak enforcement of the law. 
 
According to the MTIT’s deputy minister, the ministry offers around 10% of salaries offered by 
the private sector. This put an immense pressure on the ministry to attract skilled workers from 





With regard to corruption, Transparency-Palestine
 [23]
 has issued several reports addressing 
corruption in the public sector. Also, the World Bank (2011) has published its report on 
enhancing governance and reducing corruption. Both organisations suggest that nepotism is the 
main source of corruption in the public sector. 
 
Corruption and weak rule of law result in a process of selective enforcement, where some court 
orders are neglected, while others are enforced mainly because of political reasons. Violation of 
the rule of law is not uncommon. Within telecommunications, practices such as call tapping and 
website blocking are among the most common violations by security agencies. While such 
practices can be found in other countries, the real uncertainty comes from the fact that court 
orders specific to telecommunications disputes are overlooked by enforcement agencies. 
 
4. The Palestinian Authority’s fragility and its impact on 
telecommunications regulations 
It is apparent that reality contradicts what was designed in the Palestinian constitution (2003). 
Table 2 provides a snapshot of the institutional foundations of the Palestinian authority. Applying 
Levy and Spiller’s decision tree to the Palestinian Authority, a licence-based system with 
international guarantees is the most adequate regulatory system that will match the Palestinian 
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Table 2: Palestinian Authority Institutional Foundations 
 
Nonetheless, policy makers are pushing for a more institutionalised regulatory system that 
implements a set of global best regulatory practices. For such a system to succeed, policy makers 
have to solve two serious problems that contribute to its fragility. Fragility has two main sources: 
endogenous, represented by its weak institutions, lack of respect for rule of law, and corruption; 
and exogenous, represented by Israeli control over vital telecommunications resources. 
 
4.1  Endogenous fragility 
Assuming that the Jamaican scenario (Stirton and Lodge, 2002) is applicable to the institutional 
changes in the Palestinian territories, in the sense that a genuine attempt at regulatory reform is 
being led by the government, the resemblance ends here. This is because institutions in Jamaica 
have evolved (Stirton and Lodge, 2002), which merited them progressing on Levy and Spiller’s 
decision tree. Therefore, the complex, rule-based regulatory system was not considered a 
mismatch with the country’s institutional foundations. That is not the case for the Palestinian 
Authority as its attempt to install a complex-rule based regulatory system is crippled by the 
institutional foundations discussed in the previous section. 
 
Despite many initiatives concentrating on building a “state of institutions
 [24]
”, the process of 
building the states’ capacity is slow and subject to many roadblocks. Within telecommunications, 
the past two ministers led most of the initiatives. However, institutionalising such activities is 
also moving at a slow pace. While the latest minister has brought in a qualified team that has 
better regulatory experience, the team is still crippled by the surrounding environment with many 
Fatah party conservatives still opposing reform
[25]
. The minister himself complained that, “the 
battle has not been won yet. Dark forces are still working hard.
[26]
” Interviewed stakeholders, in 
particular ISOC.PS, CoolNet and Mr Bahour, pointed to the ongoing struggle and inability of the 
ministry to institutionalise its activities creating a gap between individual and institutional know-
how. 
 
This failure of institutionalising regulatory reforms is an endogenous fragility that policy makers 
should address. Installing a sophisticated regulatory system is not a sign of institutional evolution 
but a mismatch that leads to wasted resources. One indicator of the institutional mismatch is the 
fact that operators and service providers put their trust in individual SLAs rather than the 
ministry’s interconnection guidelines. 
 
4.2  Exogenous fragility 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) accepted the Palestinian Authority as an 
observing member. This decision has two disadvantages. On the one hand, a full membership in 
the ITU and World Trade Organisation (WTO) would have placed an obligation on the 
Palestinian Authority to comply with international agreements and upgrade its institutional 
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foundations, which is similar to what Jamaica had done (Stirton and Lodge, 2002). On the other 
hand, full membership would have obliged Israel to adhere to ITU and WTO resolutions, thus 




Issues that remained under Israeli control were vital, most importantly, access to international 
destinations, importing of equipment, access to area C
[28]
, and frequency spectrum. Table 3 
presents the problems and risks created by Israeli control and their impact on regulations and 
investment.  
Issue Description Contribution to fragility 




PA has its own international dialling 
code number (970), but does not have an 
independent international gateway, and is 
not permitted to use any international 
gateway other than the Israeli one, in 
effect, it doesn’t matter for a caller in the 
US, for example, to use Palestine’s (970) 
or Israeli (972) code to get through and 
connect to either a fixed or mobile 
Palestinian number. 
 
Inability to negotiate with neighbouring 
countries such as Jordan and Egypt for 
better prices for international traffic. 
 
Israeli operators have monopoly powers 
over Palestinian operators that result in 
higher cost for Palestinian operators and 
higher prices for consumers. 
Importing 
equipment 
Over the last 15 years Palestinian 
operators suffered from Israeli 
authorities’ continuous refusal to allow 
for some equipment to enter the 
Palestinian market. 
Networks are congested, at best, or 
poorly maintained and under-developed 
at worst. 
 
Paltel and Wataniya core network is 
hosted outside Palestine, which raise cost 
of supplying telecommunications service 
(Paltel main switches are hosted in 
London, England, which adds around 
US$ 5 million to the cost of supplying 
telecommunications services. Likewise, 




Palestinian operators have to get 
authorisation from Israeli authorities to 
install its equipment in order to serve 
communities living there. Limited 
number of antennas installed in area C 
reduces availability and quality of 
mobile telecommunications. 
Low quality of telecommunications 
services. 
 
Loss of market share (20%-40%) to 
unlicensed Israeli mobile operators. 
Spectrum 
frequency 
Managed by Israeli authorities. Israel 
delayed the release of spectrum allocated 
to Jawwal and Wataniya for 2 and 3 
years, respectively. 
Delayed operations, discouraged 
investors and decreased public trust in 
PA. 
Table 3: problems and risk created by Israeli control on telecommunications resources and their 
impact on regulations and investment 
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While operators were able to overcome most of the above problems with good marketing 
sstrategies and product differentiation plans, the real problem is spectrum management. In both 
occasions, when the PA licensed Jawwal in 1997 and Wataniya in 2006, both companies had to 




The case of Wataniya is interesting because only diplomatic pressure on Israel made it release the 
spectrum as Tony Blair used his diplomatic position as the Quartet’s special envoy to pressure 
Israeli authorities into releasing frequencies
[30]
. Although denied by Blair, it seems that 
J.P.Morgan was behind such pressure as it was a shareholder of  Qtel, the parent company of 
Watniya. Another failing project was not an option for the troubled financial services giant
[31]
. 
Shortly after Blair’s intervention, Israel released 2G frequencies and Wataniya started offering its 
services in the West Bank. 
 
5. Addressing fragility and advancing through the decision tree 
 
Setting up a sophisticated telecommunications regulatory system requires the Palestinian 
Authority to address its endogenous and exogenous fragility. With regard to endogenous fragility, 
policy makers should realise that the regulatory state they are pushing for depends on procedural 
and performance-oriented regulations and expert and efficient bureaucracy (Lodge, 1999). 
 
Thus, the Palestinian Authority has only one choice, which is to build its institutions and to train 
its bureaucracy. Until institutions develop, licence-based regulations are more adequate (Levy 
and spiller, 1994). Operators and service providers can protect their investment through licences 
that clearly define the rights and obligations of each player in the market. The presence of the 
World Bank and the Palestinian Authority membership (albeit as an observer) in the ITU and 
WTO provide an international guarantee for businesses. In particular, the involvement of the 
World Bank as a close adviser to the ministry of telecommunications has helped to produce 
licences based on best international practices and to reassure investors that the Palestinian 
Authority is serious in its telecommunications regulatory reforms. 
 
With regard to exogenous fragility, there is a need for other types of international guarantee that 
ensures Israel would comply and lift restrictions related to telecommunications. The most logical 
international guarantee would be the GATS’ Basic Agreement on Telecommunications (BTA). 
The BTA could act as a framework that regulates Israeli-Palestinians telecommunications issues 
and provide an adequate conflict resolution mechanism. Since Israel is already a member of 
GATS, mode 3 of GATS’ service delivery (Sinclair and Grieshaber-Otto, 2002) could be 
provoked and Israel would have to comply and lift any restrictions on the flow of foreign direct 
investment in the Palestinian territories including restrictions on spectrum frequency and 
equipment imports. However, in order to provoke mode 3 of GATS’ service delivery, the 
Palestinian Authority must be recognised as a state, which renders GATS and BTA as non-
enforceable.  
 
The World Bank and USAID can play a role in enhancing Palestinian-Israeli relationship through 
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facilitating communication within the Joint Technical Committee
[32]
, but history shows that Israel 
has a bargaining power during negotiations and that implementation of decisions are frequently 
delayed. 
 
Wataniya’s spectrum case has shown that diplomatic pressure backed up by foreign investors 
might be a solution. This option, however, depends on the Palestinian Authority’s ability to 
attract foreign investors to invest in its ICT sector. Since ICT-related foreign investments 
decisions are influenced by government effectiveness (Alemu and Khan, 2011), eliminating the 




This paper has presented the institutional foundations of the Palestinian Authority and explored 
the challenges facing policy makers in developing the Palestinian Authority institutions. It 
discussed two sources of fragilities that threaten regulatory reform and keeps Palestine’s 
regulatory system confined to a basic licence-based system.  
 
As most countries have entered the regulatory state, their respective appropriate regulatory 
system is a reflection of their institutional foundations. A mismatch between a states’ regulatory 
system and its institutional endowment would not lead to desirable regulatory results, nor would 
it lead to regulatory certainty and the commitments investors seek to make investments in the 
states’ ICT market. 
 
A country’s institutional foundations are represented by it judiciary, government and 
administrative capabilities, while social and political norms play an important role in building up 
those foundations and directing any subsequent reforms. Climbing up or down Levy and 
Spiller’s decision tree depends on the state of the country’s institutions. 
 
Institutional foundations in fragile states are likely to consist of a weak and corrupt judiciary, an 
elite political group that monopolise the government without proper mechanisms of alternating 
the power within the country’s social groups, and a weak, corrupt, and politically influenced 
bureaucracy. A political investment cycle that rewards businesses backing the elite political 
group in power and punishes other businesses backing rival political groups adds to the 
inefficiencies of the market, increases corruption, and decreases public trust in any regulatory 
system. For such environment, a license-based regulatory system backed with an international 
guarantee remains the most adequate to create minimum desired level of regulatory certainty and 
attract some investments to the market. 
 
This paper has shown that Palestinian Authority’s institutional foundations resemble those of 
fragile states.  Its judiciary is weak, corrupt and too inexperienced to handle telecommunications-
related disputes. Its governing system has been dominated for most of its lifetime by Fatah, and 
its bureaucracy is weak, corrupt and politically influenced. Two political investment cycles have 
seen businesses granted rents by the dominating political group, with the political group owning 
shares in these businesses. 
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Insisting on installing a sophisticated regulatory system is considered a mismatch with the 
Palestinian Authority’s institutional foundations, which would lead to waste in resources and 
efforts. Instead, the Palestinian Authority should first develop its institutional foundations then its 
regulatory system will develop. 
 
Nonetheless, the institutional development process is slow. Moreover, individualisation of 
institutional setup and internal conflict negatively affected institutional reform initiatives as it 
reduced them to a vision of few people who lack widespread support of the unskilled and 
politically influenced bureaucracy. This leads to effectiveness fragility in government, which 
negatively affects foreign investors’ decision to invest in countries that have this type of fragility.   
 
Exogenous fragility in terms of Israeli control over vital telecommunications resources, such as 
spectrum frequency, equipment imports, control over access to international destinations and 
service restrictions on area C territories within the West Bank is another factor affecting the 
Palestinian Authority’s ability to effectively control its ICT market. As Palestine is not 
recognised as a sovereign state yet, international organisations’ decisions, such as ITU and WTO, 
are not enforced. 
 
The Wataniya spectrum frequency case gives hope to the Palestinian Authority that pressure on 
Israel can produce positive results. However, such pressure was a result of commercial lobbying. 
Flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) becomes a fundamental goal in the reform agenda. As 
FDI is influenced by government effectiveness and since the Palestinian Authority’s endogenous 
fragility hinders its effectiveness, eliminating endogenous fragility becomes a prerequisite to 
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1
 Interviewees consisted of a representative from: the Ministry of Telecommunications Information Technology; the 
incumbent operator (fixed, mobile, data) – Paltel; the second mobile operator – Wataniya Palestine; the Palestinian 
IT Association of Companies; the Internet Society, Palestine chapter – ISOC.PS; Mr. Sam Bahour, an expert 
involved in the regulatory process since 1996; and two representatives of newly licensed providers of broadband 
Internet, VoIP, and Wi-Fi. 
2 
See Baldwin and Cave (1999), Geradin (2000), Geradin (2004), Smith (1997), Queck (2000), Stern and Cubin 
(2005), Stern and Holder (1999), and Stern and Trillas (2001) 
3 
The common goal of the new forces is their desire to outsource part of their operations to countries around the 
globe. This process required constant communications. As international calls were expensive and well above their 
cost to subsidise the low cost of local calls, these forces demanded for competition in the telecommunications sector.  
4 
The main objection here is that while such a narrow view would be true in developed countries, where social goals 
such as universal service and consumer protection could be attained if economic objectives are met (Nenova, 2007, 
p. 70), this is not the case in developed countries, where societal goals gain more importance and have more impact 
with regard to the trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
5 
Thatcher (1999, p. 8) shows that European Law has helped European national governments to push for the desired 
structural reforms in the telecommunications sectors as governments argued that failure of implementation reforms 
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At that time, the Palestinian Legislative Council did not exist. Laws required signature of the PA President to be 
enacted. 
8 
The PA has since sold most of its shares. 
9
 http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/Legislation/PDFPre.aspx?Y=2003&ID=14138. Arabic only, registration is required. 
10 
Article 5 of the Constitution 
11
 Ibid, Article 21 
12
 http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/en/about_muqtafi.aspx Al-Muqtafi stores all Palestinian legislation and courts’ 
judgments since 1994. It archives all judgments and enacted laws, executive orders, and the constitution under the 
Palestinian Authority Jurisdiction. 
13 
Few disputes between Paltel and citizens (subscribers or former employees) exist. The nature of such disputes 
ranges from use or sale of unlicensed equipment, payment of bills, and employment related issues. Though such 
disputes are out of the scope of this paper, courts have generally followed proper procedures and implied relevant 
law provisions in such cases. In cases where there was substantive error in judgment, appeal courts have corrected 
such mistakes. Therefore, it is safe to say that within ordinary company-citizen commercial disputes courts’ 
judgments have been impartial. 
14 
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of Court of First Instance that the dispute resolution 









Perhaps the Subscription Free Internet initiative
 
provides a clear example, where Paltel proposed a model that 
would effectively make it the only player in the wholesale market, while it would leave the retail market to Internet 
Service Providers. Despite protests from ISOC.PS, PITA, the ISPs, and others that such a move would effectively 
turn the competitive narrowband nternet market (Broadband Internet was not available then) into a monopoly, where 
competing ISP would turn into resellers of Paltel’s products, the ministry ignored such protests and approved 
Paltel’s initiative. 
19 
Over the years, the PA sold its share in Paltel. It currently hold a minority share of 6% 
20 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1311237/Special-investigation-How-Blair-rescued-Palestine-deal-worth-
200m-2m-year-paymasters.html. There has been misunderstanding of the role of the President’s family with 
Wataniya. It was believed by many that the President’s son owned shares in Wataniya.  
21 
http://maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=410486. The current telecommunications Minister has declared 
recently that Paltel has to increase its investment, especially in NGN before both parties sit down for license 
extension negotiations in 2015 
22
 For example, the ministry declared that cost of interconnection will be calculated using Long Run Incremental 
Cost method (LRIC) by April 2010. However, due to the lack of skilled employees on costing methods, LRIC 
estimations are not ready yet, and the ministry could not verify LRIC-based prices submitted by Paltel. 
23 
http://www.aman-palestine.org/eng/index.htm. International Transparency’s Corruption Perceptions Index
 
does not 
include information on Palestine’s public sector corruption. 
24 
The latest initiative came from the Palestinian 13
th
 government programme titled “Palestine: Ending the 




Conflict among government agents was apparent during discussions of the 2009 Telecommunications Law that 
establishes the independent regulatory authority. The cabinet secretary was against the law as he declared during the 
discussions that “absolute independence would lead to tampering” and questioned the need for the law altogether. 
Also, the legislative committee of the Legislative Council declared its objection to the law. 
26 
Correspondence via the IT Special Interest Group mailing list (www.itsig.org). 
27 
In the case of Kosovo, which is not recognised as a sovereign state, the protection of the United Nations has 
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helped in establishing communications networks and gaining international access through neighbouring countries 
(Cullen International, 2010). Without the protection of the United Nations, Israel has no legal obligation to adhere to 
international organisations’ decisions such as the ITU and WTO. 
28 
The Oslo agreement has split the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into three areas (A, B, and C). Area A includes 
territories that are under full authority (administration and security) of the PA. It mostly includes the main West 
Bank and Gaza Strip cities. Area B includes territories that are under partial authority (administrative), while 
security is controlled by Israeli security forces. It mostly includes towns near area A territories. Area C includes 
territories that are under the full authority of Israel. It mostly includes areas near borders, highways, and settlements. 
Territories in Areas B and C would eventually become part of Area A. In 2005, all of the Gaza Strip became part of 
area A, while most of the West Bank territories are either area B or C. The following map illustrates the situation in 
2007. Nothing significant has happened since then. 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6a/West_Bank_%26_Gaza_Map_2007_%28Settlements%29.png 
29 
According to the Palestinian deputy ministry of telecommunications, spectrum frequency is a national security 
issue for Israelis. The decision to release more spectrum frequency is not taken solely by the Israeli ministry of 
telecommunications. According to Haaretz newspaper, Israel tried to convince Jawwal (Palestine) and Orange 
(Israel) operators to share some of its spectrum frequency with Wataniya in order not to release more spectrum 
frequency for commercial use. http://www.haaretz.com/news/palestinians-still-waiting-for-better-cell-phone-service-
but-is-it-israel-s-fault-1.279578 
30 
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=187813, see also footnote 25. 
31 
In channel 4’s Dispatches investigating programme, Peter Oborne investigates Blair’s affairs in Middle East. With 
regard to the Palestinian territories, he shows that Blair, while employed as consultant to J.P.Morgan, used his 
diplomatic position as the Quartet’s Special Envoy to pressure Israel into accepting spectrum release for Wataniya 
and the build of a gas field, in which J.P.Morgan has invested. 
32 
The Joint Technical Committee was set up to overview implementation of telecommunications-related provisions 
of the Oslo agreement (World Bank, 2008, p. v). 
